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THE OHIO BILL OF RIGHTS 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
The Ohio Bill of Rights is found in Article I of the 
Ohi.o Constitution. Many of the provisions in that Arti-
cle relate to criminal practice. Section 5 provides for 
the right to jury trial. Section 9 prohibits excessive bail 
and the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. 
Section 10 guarantees the right to grand jury indict-
ment, the right to counsel, the right to confrontation, 
the right to compulsory process, the right to a speedy 
and public trial by an impartial jury, the privilege 
against self-incrimination, and the right not to be 
placed in jeopardy twice. Finally, section 14 prohibits 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Some of these 
provisions use language virtually identical to the lan-
guage used in the federal Bill of Rights. For example, 
with the exception of one word ("possessions" in lieu 
of "effects"), the search and seizure provisions of the 
Fourth Amendment and section 14 are identical. 
Other provisions differ.from their federal counterparts. 
For example, the Sixth Amendment. guarantees in "all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him ... ", whereas the analogous Ohio provision 
states: "In any trial, in any court, the party accused 
shall be allowed ... to meet the witnesses face to 
face ... " 
Prior to the 1960's the provisions of the Ohio Bill of 
Rights constituted the principal safeguards enjoyed by 
criminal defendants in this state. Federal law played 
but a small role in state criminal trials. 
Historically, the United States Supreme Court 
deferred to the states on matters of criminal 
procedure because "the problems of criminal 
law enforcement vary widely from state to 
state," because state courts generally have 
greater familiarity and expertise in criminal 
matters, and because criminal rules should be 
developed by those who bear the burden of 
enforcing them. Note, Stepping Into the 
Breach: Basing Defendants' Rights on State 
Rather than Federal Law, 15 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 339, 339 (1978). 
Pub!ic Defender: Hym::m Friedman 
THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE 
FEDERAL BILL OF RIGHTS 
The Ohio Bill of Rights, like similar provisions in 
other state constitutions, was eclipsed during the so-
called "Criminal Law Revolution" of !he Warren Court 
e'"a: The Warren Court "revolutionized'" criminal prac-
tice in several ways. First, the Court expanded the 
substantive rights of the accused. The cases are now 
familiar. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966) (Fifth Amendment applicable to custodial inter-
rogations); U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 ( 1967) (right 
to counsel attaches to lineups); Chime/ v. California, 
395 U.S. 752 (1969) (scope of search incident to ar-
rest limited to "grabbing" distance); Barber v. Page, 
390 U.S. 719 (1968) (right to confrontation requires 
actual unavailability of a witness before prior tes-
timony is admissible). 
Second, from 1961 to 1969 the Court in a series of 
decisions held most of the criminal procedure provi-
sions of the federal Bill of Rights applicable to the 
states through the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961) (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel 
and unusual punishment clause.); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Malloy 
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 {1964) (privilege against self-
incrimination); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) 
(confrontation clause); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 
U.S. 213 (1967) (right to speedy trial); Parker v. 
Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (right to impartial jury); 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 ( 1967) (compulsory 
process clause); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 
(1968) (right to jury trial); Benton v. Maryland, 395 
U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy clause). The only 
two provisions that were not "incorporated" through 
the Fourteenth Amendment were the right to a grand 
jury indictment and the prohibition against excessive 
bail. The Court, however, in Schi/b v. Kuebel, 404 
U.S. 357 ( 1971 ), has commented: "Bail, of course, is 
basic to our system of law ... and the Eighth 
Teie;Jhone: (216) 623·7223 
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Amendment"s proscription of excessive bail has been 
assumedto bave,applica!ion to tile States through the 
Fourteenth AmefidmenL"Id. at 365. Thus, the appli-
cation of federal constitutional Jaw in state criminal 
'{ cases'became,commonplaceduring this'decade. 
Third >the Warren Court· expanded the. availability of 
federal haMas corpus. making federal review of state 
criminal trials another common occurrence. E.g., Fay 
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (exhaustion requirement 
applies only to state remedies existing at time habeas 
petition filed); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 
(1 963) (parole status satisfies custody requirement). 
Since the Supreme Court could not possibly review all 
state criminal cases alleging violations of federal con-
. stitutional rights, habeas corpus was used as the en-
forcement mechanism for the new rights the Court 
had created and applied to the states. 
The advent of theBurger Cburt has halted the "rev-
olution." While few.Warren Court decisions have been 
explicitly overruled, the Burger Court has embarked 
on a period of retrenchment; the present majority has 
either limited Warren Court decisions or refused to ex-
tend them. See Kirby v. 1/Hnois, 406 U.S. 682 ( 1 972) 
(limiting Wade); U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 219 
(1973) (expanding search incident to arrest doctrine); 
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1 972) (expanding 
stop and frisk doctrine); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 
222 (1 971) (limiting Miranda). In addition, the Court 
has cut back on the availability of federal habeas re-
lief. E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (limit-
ing the availability of habeas review of Fourth 
Amendment violations); Francis v. Henderson; 425 
U.S. 536 (1976) (expanding the waiver doctrine to 
· preclude habeas review). 
THE EMERGENCE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
This period of retrenchment has resulted in the res-
urrection of state constitutions which were dormant 
during the Warren Court era. Through the interpreta-
tion of state constitutional provisions, many state 
courts have afforded criminal defendants greater pro-
tections than the present Supreme Court has afforded 
through its interpretations of the federal Constitution. 
Since state courts are the final arbiters of state con-
stitutions, the U.S. Supreme Court cannot review 
state court determinations of state law. Murdock v. 
City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). 
Moreover, if a state ground is independent and ade-
: quate to support a judgment, the Supreme Court has 
no jurisdiction over the decision even if federal issues 
are present in the case. See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 
296 U.S. 207 (1935); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 
U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). On a number of occasions 
the Supreme Court has stated that "a State is free as 
a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions 
on police activity than those this Court holds to be 
necessary upon federal constitutional standards." 
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); accord, 
Lakeside v. Oregon, 98 S.Ct. 1091, 1095 (1978); 
:Itt lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 484 (1972); Cooper 
'il~L 1. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 ( 1967). Increasingly, 
state courts have accepted this invitation. The follow-
ing is a summary of some of the areas in which state 
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courts have gone beyond the:,supreme Court in af-
fording criminal defendants rights. 
Search & Seizure 
,Jnventory:.Search;;s.' In SouthOakotav. Opperman, 
428 U.S. 364 (1976), the Supreme~ Court held a war-
rantless inventory search of an impounded au-
tomobile, including the glove compartment, did not 
violate Fourth Amendment guarantees. On remand, 
however, the Supreme .Court of South Dakota held 
the inventory violated the 'state constitution. State v. 
Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976). In so hold-
ing. the state court found the arguments of the U.S. 
Supreme Court unpersuasive: · 
Admittedly the language of Article VI, §11 is 
almost identical tci that found in the Fourth 
Amendment; however, we have the right to 
construe our state constitutional provision in 
accordance with what we conceive to be its 
plain meaning. We find that logic and a sound 
regard for the purposes of the protection af-
.forded by S.D. Co11st .• Art. VI, §11 warrant..a 
·higher standard o"tprotection for the individual 
in this instance than the u'nited States Su-
preme Court found necessary under the 
Fourth Amendment. /d. at 675. 
Other state courts have limited Opperman by holding 
.that an arrestee should be given the opportunity to 
make private arrangements for the automobile's 
safekeeping, thus avoiding impoundment and the· 
consequent inventory. See State v. Goodrich, 21 
Grim. L. Rep. 2431 (Minn. S. Ct. 1977); Chuze v. 
State, 330 So.2d 166 (Fla. 1976). . . 
· "Search Incident toArrest. In U.S. v. Robinson,414 
U.S. 218 (1973), and its companion case, Gustafson 
v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), the Supreme Court 
held that police. officers could make a full body search 
incident to an arrest for traffic offenses and other 
minor violations which involve no physical evidence. 
Both the California and Hawaii Supreme Courts have 
rejected Robinson on state constitutional grounds. 
See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.3d 528, 531 P.2d 
109.9, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975); State v. Ka!t,ma, 55 
Haw. 361,520 P.2d 51 (1974). In Brisendine the court 
stated: 
The foregoing cases illustrate the incontrover-
tible conclusion that the California Constitu-
tion is, and always has been, a document of 
independent force ... It is a fiction too long 
accepted that provisions in state constitutions 
textually identical. to the Bill of Rights were in-
tended to mirror their federal counterpart. The 
lesson of history is otherwise: The Bill of 
Rights was based upon the corresponding 
provisions of the first state constitutions, 
rather than the reverse. 531 P .2d at 1113. 
Other state courts that have refused to permit full 
body searches incident to traffic arrests are: People v. 
Garcia, 23 Grim. L. Rptr. 2184 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); 
People v. Kelly, 77 Misc.2d 264, 353 N.Y.S.2d 111 
(Grim. Ct. N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 79 Misc.2d 
534, 361 N.Y.S.2d 135 (App. Di' 1974). In addition, 
Massachusetts has limited Robinson by statute. 
,,: __ ·_. 
. . ~ 
r. -
Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. Ch. 276, § 1 (West). 
The Washington Supreme Court in State v. 
Hehman, 23 Crim. L. Rep. 2205 (1978), limited 
Robinson in a different way. The court held that "as a 
matter of public policy [a] custodial arrest for minor 
traffic violations is unjustified, unwarranted, and im-
permissible if the defendant signs the promise to ap-
pear ..... /d. at 2205. According to the court, its hold-
ing "is in keeping with the clear spirit of [state] legisla-
tion and with the entire trend of the judicial and legis-
lative philosophy in the field of traffic offenses." /d. 
"Since the custodial arrest was improper in this case, 
the search of defendant's person incident thereto was 
also improper ... " /d. at 2206. 
Consent Searches. In Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 
412 U.S. 218 (1973), the Supreme Court employed a 
totality of the circumstances test to judge the voluntar-
iness of a defendant's consent to a search. In so hold-
ing, the Court rejected the argument that a person 
had to know of his right to refuse consent in order for 
the consent to be voluntary. In State v. Johnson, 68 
N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975), the New Jersey Sup-
reme Court took a different view of a provision of the 
New Jersey Constitution which it acknowledged "is 
taken almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment." 
346 A.2d at 68 n.2. The court statoo: 
Many persons, perhaps most, would view the 
request of a police officer to make a search 
as having the force of law. Unless it is shown 
by the State that the person involved knew 
that he had the right to refuse to accede to 
such a request, his assenting to the search is 
not meaningful. ·one cannot be held to have 
waived. a right if he was unaware of its exis-
tence. 346 A.2d at 68. 
Participant Monitoring. In U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 
745 (1971), a plurality of the Supreme Court held the 
use of electronic eavesdropping devices where one of 
the parties to the monitored conversation has con-
sented to the monitoring does not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment. Thus, neither a warrant nor probable 
cause is a necessary prerequisite for participant 
monitoring. In People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 
- N.W.2d 511 (1975), the Supreme Court of Michigan 
rejected the plurality view in favor of Justice Harlan's 
dissenting opinion, which the court considered "more 
consistent with the spirit of the state constitutional pro-
tection against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
227 N.W.2d at 514. In Michigan, therefore, the war-
rant requirement, including probable cause, applies to 
participant monitoring. 
Miranda 
Impeachment Exception. In Harris v. New York, 
401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Supreme Court limited the 
effect of Miranda by holding that a defendant's un-
warned statement could be used for impeachment. 
The Supreme Courts of California, Hawaii, and Penn-
sylvania have rejected Harris as matter of state con-
stitutional law. See People v. Disbrow, 16 Cql.3d 101, 
545 P .2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976); State v. 
" Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971); 
Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 
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(1975). Alaska has reached the same result by sta-
tute: Alaska R. Crim. P. 26(g). The Hawaii Supreme 
Court in Santiago explained its rejection of Harris· as 
follows: '·[We] believe that if the rationale underlying 
Miranda is sufficient to warrant the exclusion of prior 
statements from the prosecutor's cases in chief, then 
that same rationale precludes use of those statements 
for impeachment." 492 P.2d at 664. 
Multiple Interrogations. In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 
U.S. 96 ( 1975), the defendant refused to talk to the 
police after receiving Miranda warnings. Subse-
quently, a second interrogation conducted by a differ-
ent police officer and concerning an unrelated offense 
resulted in an incriminating statement. Miranda 
warnings preceded this interrogation as well. The 
Court held the second interrogation did not violate 
Miranda. In dissent Justice Brennan noted that "no 
State is precluded by [this] decision from adhering to 
higher standards under state law. Each State has 
power to impose higher standards governing police 
practices under state law than is required by the Fed-
eral Constitution." /d. at 120. In a recent case, People 
v. Pettingill, 23 Crim. L. Rep. 2227 (1978), the 
California Supreme Court followed Justice Brennan's 
advice, holding that once a defendant refuses to 
waive his Miranda rights, he cannot be subsequently 
interrogated. 
Right to Counsel 
In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), the Su-
preme Court limited Wade by holding the right to 
counsel did ·not automatically attach at corporeal iden-
tification procedures. According to the Court, the right 
attached ohly after the initiation of adversary judicial 
proceedings. /d. at 690. The Alaska Supreme Court 
rejected Kirby on state constitutional grounds, holding 
that the right to counsel attaches, in the absence of 
exigent circumstances, when a suspect is taken into 
custody. Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Aik. 1977). In 
so holding, the court remarked: "The Alaska Constitu-
tion may have broader safeguards than the minimum 
federal standards." /d. at 641. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court reached the same result in 
Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 
351 {1974), by holding that the right to counsel at-
tached at the time of arrest. The Michigan Supreme 
Court has gone beyond these cases, holding in 
People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22 
(1974), that a defendant in custody has the right to 
counsel at photographic as well as corporeal identifi-
cation procedures. Thus, Jackson also rejects the 
Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 
300 (1973), which held the right to counsel did not 
attach at photographic identifications. 
Double Jeopardy 
Dual Sovereignty. In Bartkus v. fl!inois, 359 U.S. 
121 (1959), the Supreme Court held that an acquittal 
on federal bank robbery charges did not preclude a 
subsequent state prosecution for the same robbery. 
The double jeopardy clause was not violated, accord-
ing to the Court, because the state and federal gov-
ernments are separate sover-eigns. The "dual 
sovereignty" rationale of Bartkus was rejected re-
·6VGIILIY uy lltto f'it:;'VV I l!=liii}J.::>.IIII G '-"L!'}JI Gillet ._,.....,V• L. '-''U.~'-" v • 
Hogg, 23 Crim. L Rep . .2161 (1978). After.poiriting 
out that "Bartkus is not binding on this cotJrhwcon-
sfrlling .our-~5Eite~cOi3stitutionaldciUIJI~,je.o!Jardy~provi­
sion , .. . ",.,(id . .. at.21;61). the court ?.tated: "It is pure 
ficti.on to;.$r:tYJ~y.ar€.differenLcrimes b.e,c.awse~of . .dual 
sovereignty ;",fd. af'2i62: 'Other. state.· courts have 
reached tt:le.~same result. See People~ v.:"Cooper,. 398 
Mich. 450,'247 N.W.2d 866 (1976)~ Commonwealth v. 
Mills, 44TPa. 162, 286 A2d 638 (1971); People v. 
Abbamonte, 43 N.Y.2d 74, 400 N.Y.S.2d 766, 371 
N.W.2d 485 {1977). 
Same Offense. The Supreme· Court has adopted 
the "same evidence" test for defining the term "same 
offense'' in .the federal double jeopardy clg.use. See 
Jeffers v .. U.S., 432 U.S. 137 (1 977). Several state 
cour:ts,.h.owever; .have adopted the r:nore,,,protective 
"same tran::;action''Jest. See. People v. White; 390 
Mich. 245, 212 N.W:2d 222 (1973); Commonwealth v. 
Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854 (1974). In 
White the Michigan Supreme Court commented: 
"[G]iven our tradition of virtually unreviewable pro-
secutorial;:discretion concerning the initiation. and 
scope. of a criminal prosecution, the potenUalities for 
abuse inherent in the 'same evidence' ~test are simply 
intolerabiR" 212 N.W.2d at 225. · 
Right To Jury Trial 
In Baldwin v. NevVYork;e399 u:s:, 66 {1970), the 
Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment right to jury 
trial applied only to offenses in which. imprisonment in 
excess of six months is authorized. A number of state 
courts, on the other hand, have interpreted analogous 
provisions of state constitutions as extending the jury 
(' trial right beyond the six month restricUon. Vermont 
·and Maine r:equire .jury trials in all criminal prosecu-
tions. See State v. BeC<ker, 130 Vt. 153, 287 A2d 580 
(1972); State. v, Sklar, 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974). See 
also City of Brookings v. Roberts, 226 N.W.2d 380 
(S.D. 1 975}; Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 
(Aik. 1970}. . 
In addition, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has 
held the right to jury trial requires a twelve person jury, 
thereby rejecting the Supreme Court's position in 
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1 970). See In reAd-
visory Opinion to the Senate, 108 R.I. 628, 278 A.2d 
852 {1971). 
Ohio Cases 
In State v. Gallagher, 38 Ohio St.2d 291, 313 
N.E.2d 396 (1974), the Supreme Court of Ohio held 
that an in-custody parolee was entitled to Miranda 
warnings before being questioned by his parole of-
ficer. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari but 
then remanded the case to the Ohio Supreme Court 
because it was "unable to determine whether the 
Ohio Supreme Court rested its decision upon the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States, or Art I,§ 10, of the Ohio Constitu-
tion, or both." Ohio v. Gallagher, 425 U.S. 257, 259 
( 1 976). On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court rein-
stated its prior decision, stating that it was "indepen-
dently constrained to the result we reached by the 
Ohio Constitution." State v. Gallagher, 46 Ohio St.2d 
4 
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.demonstrates that the Ohio Constitution is al.so a 
··'docurne·nt of independent Jorce. · 
CONCLlJSION 
.;'{A,s the ,at;rove cases indiGate, d.e.fense :co.unsel 
:should:challenge:.police.practices,•and:•court: proce-
~dures on st-ate·:as \Veil as federahaonstitutional 
gmunds: Justice Brennan has written: 
[S]tate court judges, and al.so practitioners, 
do well to scrutinize constitutional decisions 
. by federal courts, for- only iFth~y are found to 
. :be logically persuasive and. well~reasoned. 
.·paying due regard to precedent and the 
policies underlying specific constitutional 
guarantees, may they properly<claim persua-
sive weight as·guideposts when interpreting 
counterpart state guarantees. I suggest to the 
bar' that, although in the past it might have 
been safe for counsel to raise only federal 
constitutional issues in state courts, plainly it 
would be most unwise these days not also to 
·raise the ·state- constitu.tional_questions. Bren-
nan State ConstitUtions and theProtection of lndi~idual Rights, 90 HarV. L Rev. 489, 502 
(1977). 
In Ohio this means asserting the guarantees found in 
the Ohio .Bill of Rights in .addition to the analogous 
· federal provisions. 
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Double Jeopardy~ Juvenile Courts 
Rules of procedure in Maryland allowed the state to 
file exceptions with a juvenilecourt to a master's non-
delinquency finding. The Supreme Court held such a 
procedure did not violate the double-jeopardy clause 
because the entire process was but a single proceed-
ing. It began with the masters hearing and culminated 
with final adjudication by the juvenile court judge. 
Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978). 
Double Jeopardy 
Where an appellate court vacates judgment on the 
grounds that the government failed to rebut an affir-
mative defense, double jeopardy attaches. A seco~d 
trial is precluded and the only proper remedy is acqUit~ 
tal. This is true even though the defendant sought a 
second trial as a remedy; st: 'h an action does not 
waive his right to an acquittal. Burks v. U.S., 98 S. Ct. 
2141 (1978). 
Double Jeopardy 
The federal rule that jeopardy attaches when ajury 
is empaneled and sworn is applicable to the states as 
an integral part of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
: 'ej.._ ments. Therefore a Montana statute providing that /iJ111 jeopardy does not attach until the first witness is tiJ : sworn is uncbnstitutional as to jury trial cases. Crist v. 
'- Bretz, 98 S. Ct. 2156 {197~). 
Plain View Doctrine 
The warrantless seizure of .auto body parts based 
upon a detective's suspici~n t~at they '!"ere stolen 
was not valid under the pla10 v1ew doctnne. The re-
quirement that "the incriminating nature of the evi-
dence [be] immediately apparent" was not met. The 
detective neither knew nor had probable cause to be-
lieve that the defendant possessed stolen property. 
State v. Williams, 23 Crim. L. Rep. 2405 (Ohio Sup. 
Ct. 1978). 
Right to Confrontation 
An Ohio trial court refused to allow the defense to 
cross-examine witnesses as to their out-of-court iden-
tifications of the defendant. The court had earlier sup-
pressed the identifications as being unduly sugges-
tive. The Sixth Circuit upheld the granting of habeas 
relief on confrontation grounds. The Sixth Amendment 
guarantees defendants the right to imp~ach. in-c?urt 
identification. with previous out-of-court 1dentlficat1on. 
Flowers v. Ohio, 564 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1977) .. 
Waiver of Counsel During Interrogation 
The Sixth Circuit held that a youth's age and confu-
sion about his rights may militate against finding a 
voluntary waiver of counsel. The Court stated that the 
sixteen'-year-old defendant should have been pro-
vided counsel when he said "maybe I should have an 
attorney." Instead, the police continued to question 
him until he confessed. The Court concluded that the 
confession was fatally tainted and that habeas relief 
should have been granted. Maglio v. Jago, 23 Crim. 
L. Rep. 2354 (6th Cir. 1978). 
Search Incident to Arrest 
Although the Court assumed there was probable 
cause to arrest the defendant, it found no grounds for 
a warrantless airport search of his luggage, The ar-
resting officer took the defendant off the airplane and 
then had the luggage brought to where he was hold-
ing the defendant. The Court held there was no justifi-
cation· for a "search of locked baggage as incident to 
arrest when the only possibility of the defendant gain-
ing access to the luggage" was through the agent's 
own acts. U.S. v. Wright, 23 Grim. L. Rep. 2385 (6th 
Cir. 1978). 
Inspection of Informant Files 
District Courts have the inherent power to hold in 
camera proceedings. Further, a District Judge may 
permit opposing counsel, under a pledge of secrecy, 
to assist him in examining the documents produced. 
Therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ~ ordering the government to disclose informant- files for 
f inspection. In re U.S., Socialist Workers Party v. At-
torney General, 565 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1977). 
5 
Right to Public Trial 
· Without notice or explanation, the trial judge barred 
the public from part of the defendanrs trial. This de~ 
privation of the constituiional right to a public trial is 
per se reversible. The pub!ic can be excluded from a 
trial only under the most exceptional circumstances, 
and then the court must show ··strict and inescapable 
necessity·· for such action. When a defendant ma~es 
a timely objection to ihe exclusion order, he need not 
show actual prejudice in order to win a .reversal. 
Kleinbart .v. U.S., 23 Grim. t.. Rep. 2326 (D.C. Ct. 
App, 1978). 
Photographic Evidence 
The trial court abused its discretion by admitting 
into evidence in a manslaughter prosecution 11 
photographs of the victim which were taken 25 days 
after the accident. Because of significant deterioration 
of the victim's appearance during that period and be-
cause medical procedures had been performed on the 
body, ~he photos were not representative of the condi-
tion of the victim on the day of the accident. Futher-
more. defendant had offered to stipulate to the nature 
and location of the injuries, the cause of death, and 
the identity of the victim_ The only issue was whether 
the defendant had pushed or attempted to restrain the 
victim. State v. Powen;_ 571 P .2d 1016 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 
1978). 
Specific Performance of Plea Bargain 
Defendant was indicted for delivery of marijuana. A 
plea bargain was made whereby the defendant 
agreed to plead guilty and undergo a sixty day evalua-
tion and diagnostic study. The state agreed to 
recommend probation if defendant did not receive an 
unfavorable diagnostic report. After receiving the re-
port, which was neither favorable nor unfavorable, the 
state opposed probation. Defendant's motion to with-
draw his guilty plea in light of the prosecutor's deci-
sion was granted. However, the W. Va. Supreme 
Court held that withdrawal of the guilty plea was a 
coerced act caused by the state's breach of the plea 
bargain and defendant was entitied to reinstatement 
of the guilty plea and specific performance of the 
agreement.Brooks v. Narick, 23 Crim. L. Rep. 2191 
(W. Va. S. Ct. App. 1978). 
Pre-Arrest Delay 
Police had verbally accused the defendant of felony 
- murder two weeks after it was committed, but did 
not formally charge him until he was paroled from 
another homicide conviction (almost four years later). 
The prosecution was ordered to establish good cause 
for such a protracted delay. The state was required to 
have more justification for the delay than that the 
police waited for the defendant to return from prison 
before arresting him. The Court held that "the 
defendant's incarceration is no excuse for putting off 
the prosecution, even though there is always the pos-
sibility that the delay may fortuitously yield additional 
evidence." People v. Singer, 23 Grim. L. Rep. 2104 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1978)~ 
Clinical Psychologist as Insanity Expert 
Prejudicial error occurred when a clinical 
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formed on the defendant, but was not allowed to ex-
press his opinion as to the defendant's mental condi-
tion. Qnee:a proper:foundation is laid, a clinical 
psycho!o_gist is_ coro.petenUo state his opinion as to an 
accuse~fsrpef!JaC~$Jgte. Bwgess v. Commonwealth, 
564 sAV::2d+53"2 {Ky. "1978). 
· SearchaiktSeizl1re .,:;_"Dropsy" Evidence 
The arresting officer's testimony that the defendant 
threw away a bag of narcotics as the officer ap-
proached was held incredible as a matter of law. Be-
cause the state failed to submit credible evidence in 
the first instance to show that the police conduct was 
legal, defendant's motion to suppress wa:s granted. 
People v. Quinones, 402 N.Y.S.2d 196 (N.Y App. 
1978). 
Conflict of Interest 
An cittorney was disqualified from representing a 
defendant due to a conflict of interest that arose when 
a former client was to testify as an important prosecu-
tion witness. The trial court stated that the attorney 
would be unable to effectively cross~examine his 
former client without intruding into matters protected 
by the attorney-client privilege. The former client had 
been indicted with the same charge as the defendant 
but had previously pled guilty. The Appeals Court af-
firmed the disqualification and held that when a trial 
court finds a serious conflict of interest, the court may 
order the attorney to withdraw notwithstanding a 
defendant's request to retain the particular attorney. 
U.S.Ii. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978). 
Right to Confrontation 
The. trial court refused to allow defense counsel to 
question a key prosecution witness about a possible 
deal between the prosecution and the witness. On 
appeal, the Court held that the prosecution's failure to 
disclose information about a possible deal and the 
· "reasonable likelihood" that the false testimony af-
fected the determination of the defendant's guilt re-
quired the granting of a new trial. Refusing to allow 
cross-examination of the witness on these matters vio-
lated the defendant's right to confrontation as guaran-
teed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. State 
v. Williams, 23 Grim. L. Rep. 2405 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 
1978). 
Warrantless Entry for Arrest 
·Absent exigent circumstances, police cannot enter 
a person's dwelling to make an arrest without a war-
rant. The rule requiring a warrant to enter a dwelling 
for search and seizure also applies to an entry for the 
purpose of making an arrest. Laasch v. State, 23 
Grim. L. Rep. 2404 (Wis. Sup. Ct. 1978). 
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree 
The complaining witness identified the defendant 
through photographs taken after the def~ndant's il-
legal arrest. The defense argued that the testimony of 
the complaining witness should have been S{jppres-
( ;ed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The State coun-
· .... tered with three arguments. The Court rejected the 
prosecution's "independent source" argument be-
6 
cause mar ooctnne .. ,s limited to an identification that 
has been acquired wholly apart from· the illegal sez-
ure." The Gourt also rejected the govemmenrs ar9\J:. 
ment thEH the:idenlification was "inevitable" becausa it 
\~ould have bee~ ~obtai.ne_d t~mugh routine investj~.:. 
tton/Such.a.deosiOn;tne Courtconcluded,would r1c~ 
onfy undermine the purpose of the exclusionar.ycru\e~· 
but would 'aJso invite widespread abuse by .law en-.. 
forcement agencies·. Finally, the Court found nothing 
in the case to support an attenuation exception. "The 
·government c-annot untaint identifications by conduct-
ing its owri interVening events ·which themselves are 
flavored with the very sarne source of impropriety:· 
Crews v. U:S., 23 Grim. L. Rep. 2381 (D.C. Cir. 
1978). 
Removal of Court~Appointed Attomey , 
A trial iudg~ may not remove a court-appointed ~.ti.­
torney from a case over his objection and that of his 
client when no justifiable basis for the removal exists. · 
. Such a removal necessitates reversal of defendant's .· 
conviction. The Sixth Amendm.ent entitl~s-.an accused..,:. 
to the assistance ofchosen counsel, whether selet1ed 
by himself or by the court. Removal of the attorney not 
only encroaches on the defendant's right to counsel, 
but also threatens the "independence of the bar which 
represents indigent defendants" by chilling "profes-
sional performance in defense advocacy." Harling v. 
U.S., 23 Grim. l.Rep. 2327 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
Civil Rights Immunity for Public Defender 
A public defender is entitled to the same absolute 
immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions as a state 
prosecutor. Since public defenders act under color of ~ 
state law, state action is present. However, policy 
considerations involving the nature of the public 
. defender-defendant relationship weigh overwhelm-
ingly in favor of immunity. Robinson v. Bergstrom, 23 
Grim. L. Rep. 2325 (7th Cir. 1978). 
Auto Stop 
Police officers were justified in approaching a vehi-
cle parked in an isolated area to investigate. After the 
driver made suspicious statements, the policemen 
were further justified in ordering the occupants out of 
the car. However, once the occupants were standing 
outside the car, the police were not justified in search~ 
ing the vehicle for weapons. Any weapons hidden in-
side were beyond the suspects' reach and posed no 
danger to the officers. Therefore, the marijuana found 
inside the car during the search was improperly 
seized. Canal Zone v. Bender, 23 Crim. L. Rep. 2359 
(5th Cir. 1 978). 
